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Averroes and the Philosophical Account of Prophecy
Richard C. Taylor
Abstract
Prophecy is conspicuous by its complete absence from all three of the commentaries on De Anima by Averroes. 
However, prophecy and philosophical metaphysics are discussed by him in his Commentary on the Parva 
Naturalia, a work written before his methodological work on philosophy and religion, the Faṣl al-maqāl, 
generally held to have been written ca. 1179-1180. The analyses and remarks of Averroes presented in that 
Commentary have been characterized by Herbert Davidson as “extremely radical” to the extent that “The term 
prophet would, on this reading, mean nothing more than the human author of Scripture; and the term revelation 
would mean a high level of philosophical knowledge”. In the present article I discuss Averroes on method in 
matters of religion and philosophy as well as prophecy in philosophically argumentative works and in dialectical 
works, with particular consideration of the reasoning of his Commentary on the Parva Naturalia. I conclude that 
Averroes found in philosophy and its sciences the most complete and precise truth content and highest levels of 
knowledge and understanding and from them constructed his worldview, while he found prophecy and religion 
to be like an Aristotelian practical science in that they concern good and right conduct in the achievement of an 
end attained in action, not truths to be known for their own sake.
Introduction
Prophecy is an essential part of Islam as practiced throughout the ages and, with the signiicant 
exception of the infamous Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyaʾ al-Rāzī (d. 925), is acknowledged 
by all the major philosophers of the classical rationalist tradition as central to religion, the wellbeing 
of society, and human happiness. In Islam it is understood that God has sent many prophets but it 
is Muḥammad himself who is the most important for reciting the Qurʾān so generously sent by God 
to human beings who already had the natural ability to know God as Creator and to know right 
actions by nature (iṭra). Al-Fārābī himself made prophecy and the messenger known in philosophy 
as the Agent Intellect an integral part of philosophical psychology and epistemology of human 
knowing. The same is true of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā) who seems to have felt even more strongly about 
the necessity of integrating religious phenomena of Islam with rational philosophical knowledge,1 
even to the point of providing a treatise on the proof of prophecy.2
Averroes (Ibn Rušd) was himself a religious judge, rose to become chief judge in religious law 
at Seville and Cordoba, and even wrote a handbook of Islamic jurisprudence in which the Prophet 
is, of course, repeatedly cited.3 In his treatise on religious reasoning, al-Kašf ʿan manāhiǧ al-adilla 
1 D. Gutas, “Avicenna’s Philosophical Project”, in P. Adamson (ed.), Interpreting Avicenna. Critical Essays, 
Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 2013, pp. 28-47, part. p. 33.
2 Ibn Sīnā, Risālah fī iṯbāt al-nubuwwāt, ed. M.E. Marmura, Dār al-nahār li-l-našr, Bayrūt 1968.
3 Ibn Rušd, Bidāyat al-muǧtahid wa-Nihāyat al-muqtasib, Dār al-Maʿrifa al-Qāhira, 2 vol., 1402/1982.
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fī ʿaqāʾid al-milla or The Explanation of the Sorts of Proofs in the Doctrines of Religion,4 prophecy 
is mentioned many times and is likewise assumed as a foundation of religious doctrine. This topic 
also is touched upon in his Tahāfut al-tahāfut or Incoherence of the Incoherence5 many times. And 
prophecy is discussed in his work commonly known as the Decisive Treatise, his Kitāb faṣl al-maqāl 
wa-taqrīr mā bayna aš-šarīʿa wa-l-ḥikma min al-ittiṣāl.6 Hence, one might reasonably expect he 
would follow his well-known predecessors in the classical rationalist tradition of philosophy in 
the lands of Islam and set out an account of prophecy in his three De Anima commentaries as 
part of his philosophical psychology. Yet that is not the case. Averroes does not address the issue 
of prophecy at all in his Short, Middle and Long Commentaries on De Anima. Perhaps the most 
important philosophical commentary in which he critically considers the consequences and issues 
of the integration of philosophy and prophecy is his Commentary on the Parva Naturalia,7 a 
4 Ibn Rušd, al-Kašf ʿan manāhiǧ al-adilla fī ʿaqāʾid al-milla, ed. M. ʿĀbid al-Jābirī, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-
ʿArabīya, Bayrūt 1998, 20012. An English translation is available in Faith and Reason in Islam. Averroes’ Exposition of 
Religious Arguments, tr. I. Najjar, One World, Oxford 2001. 
5  Averroès, Tahāfut at-tahāfut, Texte arabe inédit établi par M. Bouyges, Imprimerie Catholique, Bayrūt 1930, 1987 
(Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum, Série arabe III); English translation in Averroes’ Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of 
the Incoherence), tr. by S. Van Den Bergh, 2 vol., Luzac & Co., London 1954 (rpt. 1969, 1978), e.g., pp. 427-8; tr. pp. 257-8.
6  Averroes. The Book of the Decisive Treatise Determining the Connection Between the Law and Wisdom & Epistle Dedica-
tory, tr. and ed. Ch.E. Butterworth, Brigham Young U.P., Provo Utah 2001. I have sometimes given a literal rending of the title 
as The Book of the Distinction of Discourse and the Establishment of the Connection between the Religious Law and Philosophy 
following the critique of European translations by El Ghannouchi, “Distinction et relation des discours philosophique et 
religieux chez Ibn Rushd: Faṣl al maqāl ou la double verité”, in R.G. Khoury (ed.), Averroes (1126-1198) oder der Triumph des 
Rationalismus, Internationales Symposium anlässlich des 800. Todestages des islamischen Philosophen, Universitätsverlag C. 
Winter, Heidelberg 2002, pp. 139-45, part. p. 145. See Taylor, “Ibn Rushd / Averroes and ‘Islamic’ Rationalism”, in Medieval 
Encounters. Jewish, Christian and Muslim Culture in Conluence and Dialogue 15 (2009), pp. 125-35. [Special issue on Al-
Andalus: Cultural Difusion and Hybridity, ed. I. Coris]; Id., “Averroes on the Sharīʿah of the Philosophers”, in R.C. Taylor 
– I. Omar (eds.), The Muslim, Christian, and Jewish Heritage: Philosophical and Theological Perspectives in the Abrahamic 
Traditions, Marquette U.P., Milwaukee (WI) 2012, pp. 283-304; and Id., “Providence in Averroes”, in P. d’Hoine - G.Van 
Riel (eds.), Fate, Providence and Moral Responsibility in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Thought. Collected Studies in 
Honour of Carlos Steel, KU Leuven U.P., Leuven 2014 (Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, De Wulf - Mansion Centre, 
Series I), pp. 454-72. Cf. the introduction pp. 1-3 by Campanini to his translation in Averroes, the Decisive Treatise. The Con-
nection Between Islamic Religious Law and Philosophy, trans. and ed. M. Campanini, Gorgias Press, Piscataway NJ (2017). 
“Decisive Treatise” in the sense of a determining or determinative account by Averroes as judge and legal scholar will suice 
for present purposes. The rhyme of al-maqāl with ittiṣāl may support the short title as Kitāb faṣl al-maqāl. There may also be 
an intentional connection to the use of faṣl in Qurʿān 38:20. My thanks to Josep Puig Montada and Fouad Ben Ahmad for 
sharing their insightful relections on this issue. Precisely how the title should be understood requires further relection. 
7  Averrois Cordubensis Compendia Librorum Aristotelis qui Parva Naturalia vocantur, Arabic text, ed. H. Blumberg, 
The Mediaeval Academy of America, Cambridge (Mass.) 1972. English translation as Averroes. Epitome of Parva Naturalia, 
tr. H. Blumberg, The Mediaeval Academy of America, Cambridge (Mass.) 1961. In his Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction 
with the Active Intellect, a work which sets forth an account of philosophical psychology like that found in the Short Com-
mentary on the De Anima, Averroes provides a thoroughgoing analysis of human knowing in response to Aristotle’s remarks 
at the end of De Anima 3.7. There Aristotle raised the question of whether separate things can be known by human beings 
existing in the body. (Averroes again treats of this issue much later in book 3, comment 36, of this Long Commentary on the 
De Anima of Aristotle. See Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros, ed. F.S. Crawford, 
Medieval Academy of America, Cambridge Mass. 1953 [Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem. Versionum Latinarum 
VII, 1], pp. 479-502; and Averroes (Ibn Rushd) of Cordoba, Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, Translated with 
Introduction and Notes by R.C. Taylor with Th.-A. Druart Subeditor, Yale U.P., New Haven 2009, pp. 381-401). In the inal 
sections of the Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction after his philosophical accounts have been set out, Averroes works to 
show how philosophical perfection of the soul and the apprehension of God as the First Form accords with religious law and 
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work with discussion of issues raised in his study of a curiously novel version of the Parva Naturalia 
of Aristotle.8
In the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia Averroes provides a presentation of prophecy 
distinctively diferent both from what is found in al-Fārābī and Avicenna and from what is set forth 
in his own Faṣl al-maqāl, al-Kašf , and Tahāfut al-tahāfut. The peculiarity of his analysis and teaching 
in the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia is noted by Herbert Davidson who writes, 
Averroes is making an extremely radical statement for a medieval philosopher, a statement from which 
he appears to retreat elsewhere. He is asserting that the phenomena we are considering, including 
revelation and prophecy, give no reliable information about matters belonging to the domain of science, 
not even by furnishing the uneducated with a igurative representation of theoretical truths. Revelation 
and prophecy do not, either expressly or allusively, instruct mankind about God, the universe, creation, 
the human soul. They promulgate no rules of human behavior leading to eudaemonia. Revelation as 
well as the written record of revealed knowledge thus contribute nothing to the soul’s well-being.9
In noting the diference between what Averroes says in the Tahāfut al-Tahāfut and what we ind 
in the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia, Davidson further remarks that
The discrepancy is harsh. The Commentary on the Parva Naturalia advanced carefully reasoned 
arguments to show that the phenomenon of revelation cannot conceivably provide knowledge 
about subjects belonging to the domain of science and philosophy, that revelation cannot even recast 
theoretical knowledge in igurative images for the use of common people. Averroes’ Tahafut al-Tahafut 
and semipopular works airm, on the contrary, that the prophet and the phenomenon of revelation do 
teach theoretical matters to the unenlightened in a igurative language comprehensible to them, and 
that revelation hints to potential philosophers where the purer expression of truth lies.10
Suggesting two ways of dealing with the diference of accounts, one that “Averroes may have 
changed his mind” and the other that the contexts of works may have determined the diference, 
Davidson writes regarding the latter,
The intent would be instead that the human author of Scripture irst acquired theoretical knowledge 
through proper scientiic methods and then coolly and deliberately – not through an inspired 
imaginative faculty – recast his hard-won philosophic knowledge into language appropriate for his less 
prayer for the sake of the remembrance of God. See The Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect by Ibn 
Rushd with the Commentary of Moses Narboni, Ed. and tr. K.P. Bland, The Jewish Theological Seminar of America, New York 
1982, pp. 103-5; also see p. 69 and p. 87. The Commentary on the Parva Naturalia, the Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction 
and the Short Commentary on the De Anima are all doctrinally prior to his Middle Commentary on the De Anima. They are 
also temporally prior to his account in the Faṣl al-maqāl of methodology and its theological companion piece, al-Kašf, both of 
which are generally held to have been written around 1179-80. Prophecy is briely discussed in a Farabian political fashion in 
his Commentary on the Republic of Plato. See Averroes On Plato’s Republic, English tr. by R. Lerner, Cornell U.P., Ithaca (NY) 
- London 1974, pp. 48, 72, 80-81.
8  See R. Hansberger, “Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs: Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia in Arabic Guise”, in C. Grellard - 
P.-M. Morel (eds.), Les Parva Naturalia d’ Aristote: Fortune antique et médévale, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris 2010, 
pp. 143-62.
9 Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes On Intellect. Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect and Theo-
ries of Human Intellect, Oxford U.P., New York - Oxford 1992, p. 344.
10 Davidson Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes (above, n. 9), p. 350.
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enlightened brethren. The term prophet would, on this reading, mean nothing more than the human 
author of Scripture; and the term revelation would mean a high level of philosophical knowledge.11
It is evident enough that Averroes may well have had a change of mind as to whether prophecy 
should be discussed in the context of philosophical psychology given its absence from his commentaries 
on De Anima.12 The question of whether there is a doctrinal or perhaps methodological change 
involves a larger consideration of his philosophical thought on the issue of prophecy. That, however, 
requires consideration of his methodology in dealing with religious matters in his various kinds of 
writings. Hence, in what follows I irst set out Averroes’s account of method in writing on matters 
that concern issues involving the intersection of religion and philosophy, a method that requires a 
distinction of discourse between writings that are ‘evident’ (ẓāhir) as open to all and writings that 
are ‘interpreted’ (muʾawwal) as reserved solely for the philosophically astute. Second, I consider 
prophecy in a selection of key ‘evident’ works. Third, I consider prophecy in selected passages of 
some philosophical works where matters of concern to religion are treated following the ‘interpreted’ 
approach. Fourth, I make application of this method to his own works in reference to the strong 
remarks of Davidson quoted above. Finally, I conclude with a consideration of his world view and 
what appears to be his idiosyncratic conception of religion.
1. Averroes on Method in Matters of Religion and Philosophy
Averroes’s famous disavowal of the possibility of a double truth, one for religion and one 
for philosophy and wisdom (including science), with the clear statement of the unity of truth 
in his Faṣl al-maqāl that “truth cannot contradict truth,”13 is the foundational principle that 
underlies his distinction of discourse. This requires that where there is disagreement on issues 
that are included in the subject matter of both religious and philosophical study and investigation, 
priority be given to the philosophical and scientiic interpretation absolutely speaking. Yet the 
majority of people are not capable of grasping this distinction of discourse and of reconciling such 
an interpretation with religious discourse since this latter by its very nature is meant to be emotive 
and dialectically persuasive. Accordingly Averroes sets out a psychological division of human 
beings into three groupings. There are those who are moved by the rhetoric of emotional suasion 
through accounts that afect the heart and imagination. Others give assent to dialectical reasoning 
based on religious postulates yielding understandings in accord with religious tradition. The 
third consists of those who are intellectuals knowledgeable and trained in the philosophical arts 
employing the reasoning of logic and the method of demonstration. The irst two are persuaded to 
assent by ways that may in fact hit on the truth though there is no necessity that they entail truth. 
The third, however, by the very method of demonstration with the use of premises known to be 
necessary and true and with the employment of valid syllogistic form, can attain truth per se and 
with necessity.14 Of course, Averroes clearly states that some fundamentals of religion are such 
that they must be held by the people of all three levels, namely God’s existence, His dispatching 
11 Ibid., pp. 351-2. Emphasis by Davidson.
12  While it is not what Davidson seems to have in mind, I want to suggest that the Commentary on the Parva 
Naturalia may have been written before Averroes came to be fully determined to use methodologically the distinction of 
ẓāhir and muʾawwal writings separating modes of discourse. 
13  See R. Taylor, “‘Truth does not contradict truth’: Averroes and the Unity of Truth”, Topoi 19 (2000), pp. 3-16.
14  See Taylor, “Ibn Rushd / Averroes and ‘Islamic’ Rationalism” (above n. 6), and “Averroes on the Sharīʿah of the 
Philosophers” (above, n. 6).
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of prophets to humanity and an afterlife of reward and punishment.15 To these universal 
requirements Averroes adds that in the case of philosophical interpretations that may confuse 
the general populace irrespective of their truth, these may not be shared outside the circle of the 
third group, the people of demonstration. For those incapable of understanding at this highest 
level, these interpretations would pose a serious threat to religious belief, perhaps even leading to 
unbelief.16 Such is the case with the issue of the nature and meaning of the afterlife.17 Hence, the 
distinction of discourse supports the practical life of members of society who are guided by religious 
teachings toward the good and right in their lives as individuals and members of the community 
of believers. It also allows for religious teachings to be interpreted by those with qualiied skills 
and with insight and sensitivity regarding the good of all, provided they not undermine those less 
capable of understanding.
In his Kašf Averroes refers to this distinction of discourse in matters of religion when he writes, 
In a separate work [scil. the Faṣl al-maqāl] we have already made clear the congruity of [philosophical] 
wisdom with [religious] Law (al-ḥikma li-š-šarʿ) and the command of religion for [the doing of 
philosophy]. We said there that [religious] Law (al-šarīʿa) has two parts: [one] evident and [one] 
interpreted (ẓāhir wa-muʾawwal). The evident is obligatory for the majority (al-ǧumhūr) and the 
interpreted (al-muʾawwal) obligatory for the learned (al-ulamāʾ). The obligation of the majority in 
regard to it is to take it according to its evident sense and to refrain from interpreting it (taʾwīla-hu); for 
the learned it is not permitted to inform the majority of its interpretation.18
In this work his concern is to investigate ways of reasoning concerning religious beliefs which are 
evident (ʿan al-ẓāhiri min al-ʿaqāʾidi) and proper for belief by the people (al-nās), not to delve into 
matters of interpretation suited only to the learned well versed in philosophy and the sciences. His 
rationale is that the people of the religion of Islam have been confused by many publicly professed 
interpretations that stray “from the intent of the lawgiver” (ʿan maqṣid al-šāriʿ).
In this way Averroes sets out a methodology regarding matters of religion which intersect with 
philosophical studies. In his own works this distinction is maintained in the surface text with the Faṣl al-
maqāl, al-Kašf  ʿ an manāhiǧ, and the Tahāfut al-tahāfut which should be classiied as dialectical (and 
perhaps in parts rhetorical) works with their starting points being fundamental principles of religion. 
The target audiences for these works are stated to be people of the rhetorical and dialectical modes of 
assent.19 In contrast, his philosophical works which he calls demonstrative are concerned with what 
can be determined through human rational scientiic investigation and learning. While these two 
modes of discourse are to be employed, airmed and maintained for the good of the majority in society, 
15  Averroes Faṣl al-maqāl, p. 18 Butterworth.
16  Averroes, Faṣl al-maqāl, p. 21 Butterworth.
17  Ibid.
18 Ibn Rušd, al-Kašf, p. 99 al-Jābirī. My translation.
19 See Averroes, Faṣl al-maqāl, pp. 19 and 21; al-Kašf, pp. 99-100 al-Jābirī; Tahāfut al-tahāfut, pp. 427-8 Bouyges, 
tr. pp. 257-8. Cf. B.S. Kogan, Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation, SUNY Press, Albany (NY) 1985, pp. 255-6. 
In the case of another dialectical work, his Question on Divine Knowledge, the so-called Damima, his account is largely 
a philosophical explanation of God’s prior eternal knowledge not being dependent on worldly things. He means to 
imply – without suicient explanation – that divine knowledge includes knowledge of particulars. See the text in Faṣl 
al-maqāl, p. 42 Butterworth. His philosophical account of divine knowledge elsewhere indicates a lack of knowledge of 
particulars as such on the part of God. See Averroes, Commentary on the Parva Naturalia, pp. 74-75 Blumberg. Also see 
Averroès, Tafsir ma baʿd at-tabiʿat (above, n. 5), pp. 1707-8. 
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the principle of the unity of truth still applies. That is, in matters of religion where religious teachings 
and philosophical reasoning intersect, there is one truth, not two, and the primacy of philosophy with 
its method of demonstration must be maintained, precisely as argued in the Faṣl al-maqāl.
I have argued elsewhere that this distinction is maintained by Averroes regarding the issues 
of personal immortality, divine providence and creation.20 As he points out in the Faṣl al-maqāl, 
the issue of the afterlife is a matter of considerable dispute over its full meaning and purpose and 
disputation of that sort must not be shared with the majority who would surely be confused and 
harmed by such questioning. Instead, they must be permitted only the ‘evident’ understanding and 
not be exposed to the ‘interpreted’ understanding.21 Following the guidelines of the Faṣl al-maqāl 
reiterated in al-Kašf and the Ṭahāfut al-ṭahāfut, the truth of the matter is to be determined in the 
philosophical sciences. There is no doctrine of an afterlife in his Short and Middle Commentaries 
on De Anima and even assertions of the absence of an afterlife for individuals are expressed in his 
Long Commentary on the De Anima and his Long Commentary on the Metaphysics.22 As for divine 
providence, in his Tahāfut al-tahāfut he presents the ‘evident’ account with God as the intentional 
agent of providence clearly airming it, while in the Long Commentary on the Metaphysics he denies 
divine intentionality through direct, eicient, providential causation and instead airms that God’s 
providence must be understood as per accidens to God’s own self-understanding.23 Hence, in these 
cases the true understanding of each issue is to be had in philosophy with ‘interpreted’ meanings for 
these important religious teachings, interpretations that must be kept from the majority.
2. Prophecy in Three Dialectical Religious Works
In the Faṣl al-maqāl prophecy is repeatedly airmed throughout as is the division of the levels 
of religious meaning in scripture appropriate for the three groupings of people discussed above. 
As also indicated earlier, all three are said by Averroes to have the ability to know (al-maʿrifa) in 
an airmative way the existence of God, his sending of prophets to humankind, and reward and 
punishment in the afterlife: “[T]he three sorts of indications due to which no one is exempted from 
assenting to what he is responsible for being cognizant of – I mean, the rhetorical, dialectical and 
demonstrative indications – lead to these three roots”.24 These are the fundamental beliefs that lead 
human beings to proper action and all are airmed in the Qurʾān.
In the Tahāfut al-tahāfut the airmation of prophecy is also assumed throughout.25 There 
Averroes asserts, as expected, that miracles are principles of religion not to be questioned or doubted 
because they are beyond human apprehension. Their value lies in guiding human beings to virtue and 
so they play a key role in the foundational assumptions of practical science.26 Even so, the miracles 
20 R.C. Taylor, “Personal Immortality in Averroes’ Mature Philosophical Psychology”, Documenti e studi sulla 
tradizione ilosoica medievale 9 (1998), pp. 87-110; Id., “Averroes on the Ontology of the Human Soul”, Muslim World 
102 (2012), pp. 580-96; Id., “Conceiving Creation According to Ibn Rushd / Averroes” (video lecture), The Catholic 
University of America, 3 December 2013 available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t8UpixK0hUs; and Id., “Provi-
dence in Averroes” (above, n. 6).
21  Averroes, Faṣl al-Maqāl, pp. 20 f. Butterworth.
22  See Averroes, Tafsir ma baʿd at-tabiʿat, pp. 1612-13 Bouyges. Also see Taylor “Ibn Rushd / Averroes and ‘Islamic’ 
Rationalism” (above n. 6); and Id., “Averroes on the Ontology of the Human Soul” (above, n. 20).
23  See Taylor, “Providence in Averroes” (above, n. 6).
24  Averroes, Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 18 Butterworth.
25  See, for example, Averroes, Tahāfut al-tahāfut, pp. 427-8 Bouyges, tr. pp. 257-8.
26  Averroes, Tahāfut al-tahāfut, pp. 514 f. Bouyges, tr. pp. 314 f.
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performed by prophets need not be considered to be the bringing about of what is logically impossible 
but perhaps rather what is possible in itself but not possible for human beings. However, the most 
certain of all miracles is the Qurʾān itself:
The clearest of miracles is the Venerable Book of Allah, the existence of which is not an interruption of 
the course of nature assumed by tradition, like the changing of a rod into a serpent, but its miraculous 
nature is established by way of perception and consideration of every man who has been or will be till 
the day of resurrection. And so this miracle is far superior to all others.27
Further, the true reality of the nature of the prophet as prophet is to be found “in the act of making 
known the mysterious and establishing laws which are in accordance with the truth and which bring 
about acts that will determine the happiness of the totality of mankind.”28 The true airmation of 
the prophet lies in this and not in the attainment of hidden knowledge through dreams which may 
have natural explanations.29 The religious laws that come from God via prophets together with natural 
human reason are needed for the sake of the construction of a proper political structure and society. Basic 
principles common to all religions received from prophets and lawgivers have their value and certiication 
in the guidance of human beings away from wickedness and toward actions that are virtuous.30
In al-Kašf Averroes devotes several pages to the issue of God’s sending of messengers, including a 
detailed critical analysis of religious reasoning by dialectical theologians followed by an explanation of 
the Qurʾān itself and the success of its message for the betterment of humankind. The airmation of 
the prophet rests on two principles: the evident existence of prophets as conveyers of religious laws in 
revelation concerning knowledge and right actions for the attainment of happiness, and the evident 
function of prophets as setting out religious laws in revelation from God.31 It is not necessarily the case that 
every miracle worker is a prophet, but it is the case that the Qurʾān itself with the knowledge it provides 
regarding religious laws, right human conduct, and even more about the nature of God is rightly deemed 
miraculous for its consequences.  In this the proof of God’s prophet is the goodness of the Qurʾān in its 
presence in guiding human beings, just as the proof of the physician lies in the actual healing of the sick.32
In each of these works the existence and nature of prophecy is taken as evident in the experience 
of human beings in connection with the Qurʾān’s message which provides religious laws for the 
guidance of humankind toward goodness. In the religious context of these writings, the soundness of 
religious scripture, like the proof of the physician found in the cure of the patient, lies in the positive 
outcome for human society.33
3. Prophecy in Four Philosophical Works
The Commentary on the Parva Naturalia
The Commentary on the Parva Naturalia is a rather odd text, as mentioned earlier, because 
it is based on a substantially revised and reworked version of Aristotle’s text that circulated 
27  Averroes, Tahāfut al-tahāfut, pp. 515-16 Bouyges; tr. p. 315.
28  Averroes, Tahāfut al-tahāfut, p. 516 Bouyges; tr. p. 316.
29  Averroes, Tahāfut al-tahāfut, p. 533 Bouyges; tr. p. 326.
30  Averroes, Tahāfut al-tahāfut, pp. 584-5 Bouyges; tr. p. 361.
31  Averroes, Al-Kašf, pp. 179-80.
32  Averroes, Al-Kašf, pp. 184-5.
33  For a valuable discussion of the reasoning of Averroes on prophecy in his al-Kašf, see N. Zouggar, “La prophétologie 
d’Averroès dans le Kašf mahāhig al-adilla”, Annales Islamologiques 46 (2012), pp. 387-408.
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in Arabic.34 The key part for present concerns is Averroes’s discussion of prophecy in the section 
corresponding to Aristotle’s On Dreams. For Averroes dreams may be true or false but either way 
they relate to the imagination (al-mutaḫayyala) and people believe that prophecy is from God 
(yaʿtaqidūna fī l-waḥyi annahu min Allāh). It seems particularly to involve matters of knowledge 
relevant to the attainment of happiness according to them (ʿindahum).35 But it comes about in 
us in the same way as the primary principles of understanding, that is, the way the agent intellect 
bestows those primary principles which can be helpful in the forming of new knowledge.36 What is 
most mysterious, however, is that the intelligences themselves – this includes the agent intellect as 
well as God properly speaking – cannot comprehend particulars since they have no matter and so 
only know universals. Regarding this Averroes expresses amazement over two issues. First, how can 
the human imagination get particulars of dreams from a universal immaterial nature which is an 
intellect? Second, how does the separate intellect (e.g., the agent intellect or even God) single out the 
particular recipient for the particular content with the particular dream if that intellect only knows 
universals?37 With no lack of boldness, Averroes then writes, “Now the discussion concerning these 
matters, even though it be very di cult for human comprehension, must nevertheless be undertaken 
to the limit of one’s natural capacity for comprehension, for the essence of  happiness (ǧawharu al-
saʿādati) is nothing more than this very thing”.38
We can see here that the irst issue is metaphysically problematic. But Averroes handles it in a 
way similar to what he does in the Short Commentary on the De Anima and similar to what can be 
found in Ibn Baǧǧa.39 Since intelligibles from the agent intellect cannot be received as such in the 
particular human imagination belonging to the human knower, then the universals are received into 
the imagination as particulars. In the Short Commentary this means that the power called material 
intellect is a disposition of the forms in the particular human imagination, not new forms. Perhaps 
we can describe this by saying that the particular in the imagination comes to have a qualiication 
relating to universality such that the particular can be seen in the light of universality or under a mode 
or consideration of universality, though Averroes does not spell all this out in the Short Commentary. 
What is in the imagination then can in some way stand for the universal though the universal as 
such cannot be received into a particular human imagination without being particularized and no 
longer being universal. Universals then are received as particulars and are received into the particular 
imagination in its unique human circumstances.40 What is received is received in the mode of the 
recipient, not in the mode of a separate immaterial intellect. Hence, what the individual receives is an 
individual spiritual (ruḥānī) form that is similar to the intelligible41 and that, it seems, must function 
as a representation of the intelligible while also bearing some content similarity to what is in the 
intelligible.42  The epistemological account by Averroes in the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia 
34  R. Hansberger, “The Arabic Adaptation of the Parva Naturalia (Kitāb al-Ḥiss wa-l-maḥsūs)”, Studia graeco-arabica 
4 (2014), pp. 301-14.
35  Averroes, Comm. Parva Naturalia, p. 67 Blumberg; tr. p. 40.
36  Averroes, Comm. Parva Naturalia, p.73 Blumberg; tr. p. 42.
37  Averroes, Comm. Parva Naturalia, pp. 74-75 Blumberg; tr. pp. 43-44.
38  Averroes, Comm. Parva Naturalia, p. 75 Blumberg; tr. p. 44.
39  See my discussion of Ibn Baǧǧa in the introduction to Averroes, Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, 
pp. XXV-XXVII and LXXXIX-XCIII Taylor-Druart.
40  Cf. Averroes, Comm. Parva Naturalia, p. 81 Blumberg; tr. p. 47. 
41  Ibidem.
42  Cf. Averroes, Comm. Parva Naturalia, p. 82 Blumberg; tr. p. 48.
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deserves a full comparative study of its precise relation to the epistemology of the Short Commentary, 
something beyond the limits of the present article. Yet it is clear that this explanation provides a 
not unfeasible account of how particular human minds can hold representations of universals, an 
account Averroes never develops further elsewhere. Still, the problem remains on the side of the 
immaterial intellectual agent in relation to a particular recipient.
The second issue is religiously problematic in the extreme if, as people of religion commonly 
believe, prophecy is from God and directed to determinate particular individuals as prophets. The 
implied common religious assumption here is the view that in the case of prophetic dreams God is 
providing particular intentional willed providential assistance or revelation to a particular individual. 
This would mean, for example, that God chose some particular human to be his prophet through 
whom God revealed the particular words of the Qurʾān by the command to recite made to this 
particular human by the angel Gabriel, an intellect separate from matter. Yet as pure intellect, how 
could a particular recipient of prophecy and revelation be chosen by a separate intellect? However, 
even after explicitly insisting on its importance in the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia, Averroes 
simply does not say a word on this issue and does not deal directly with it at all in this work; clearly it 
must remain as remarkable and challenging as his exclamation indicated. Why does he not make his 
views explicit?
It seems that Averroes found himself on the horns of a dilemma. To assert such a philosophical 
teaching that immaterial entities know only universals and not particulars would involve 
contradicting common religious teachings about particular willed divine action in revelation to a 
particular prophet; and to assert the alternative would be to contradict the philosophical principle 
that knowledge on the part of separate entities consists of immaterial universals and to hold that 
those entities somehow possess knowledge of determinate particular entities.
Averroes does, however, address the issue indirectly in the inal pages of his treatment of dreams 
by considering the nature of the knowledge purportedly gained in dreams. Earlier in the Commentary 
on the Parva Naturalia while addressing the issue of prerequisites for the attainment of knowledge 
by a particular individual Averroes explains that knowledge of concepts is culturally, temporally, 
geographically and even corporeally speciic and must also be based on a prior natural experience 
through the senses of what will be known.43 This consideration arises again a few pages later as to 
whether what is gained in dreams is of theoretical knowledge, practical knowledge or a particular 
cogitative power (quwwa ikriyya ǧuzʾiyya). As indicative of future particulars, dreaming is of the last 
kind. It may be believed (qad yuẓannu) some parts of practical knowledge as found in medicine may be 
grasped in sleep. However, the notion that dreams would reveal knowledge in the theoretical sciences 
is completely antithetical to the very nature of such knowledge. Theoretical knowledge is garnered 
through experience, as noted earlier, and the primary propositions provided to human beings by 
the intellect (scil., the agent intellect).44 Were it to be provided immediately through dreams, those 
primary propositions given for the sake of knowledge formation would be teleologically valueless (as 
also would sensation). Here this would not be attained through an apprehension of causes but rather 
without human efort and directly in dreams. Entities capable of this would be of a nature altogether 
diferent from that of human beings. For Averroes such a thing is an impossibility, a method of 
knowledge completely alien to the nature of human beings. Hence, the implication is that the very 
notion of a separate intellect which could provide a knowledge of theoretical matters such as the 
43  Averroes, Comm. Parva Naturalia, p. 47 Blumberg.
44  Averroes, Comm. Parva Naturalia, p. 79 Blumberg.
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nature of human beings or the relationship of body and soul and how they should act in accord with 
their natural good is impossible. In this early work no direct solution on the second issue of how 
a separate immaterial intellect could pick out a particular recipient is provided; instead, Averroes 
explains how the communication of knowledge to a human being by such an intellect is itself an 
impossible notion. No further implication is explicitly provided even though understanding these 
matters properly should “be undertaken to the limit of one’s natural capacity for comprehension, for 
the essence of happiness is nothing more than this very thing”.
Philosophical Commentaries on the De Anima
Averroes wrote three commentaries on the De Anima of Aristotle and in none of them is there an account 
of prophecy found accompanying his difering considerations of human knowing. Rather, in each of them 
we ind wholly naturalistic accounts with the separate agent intellect acting as a formal actuating principle 
that makes intellectual abstraction possible. In each work sensory experience, primary principles from the 
agent intellect for the formation of intelligibles, and a receptive subject for the apprehension of abstracted 
intelligibles all play similar roles. The diferences between these works stem from diverse conceptions of 
the nature of intelligibles in act and the required character of their subject, as I have explained elsewhere.45 
For reference in further discussion below, it is also worth noting here that none of these commentaries has 
provision for the continued existence of the human soul after death.
In his Short Commentary or Mukhtaṣar the human power of imagination in relation to 
impressions received by the external senses and afecting the common sense plays a distinctive 
and higher role than it does in lower animals insofar as the still particular forms or intentions that 
come to be in the individual human being’s imagination become the subjects for intelligibles in act 
and so for the predication of universals.  It “is distinguished by the fact that it does not need an 
organic instrument for its activity”.46 This is because in this work Averroes conceives the material 
intellect, that is, the power receptive of the intelligibles in act in the soul that make possible human 
intellectual understanding, to exist in the individual human being as a disposition belonging to the 
forms in the human imagination. In his own version of an account inspired in part by Ibn Bāǧǧa 
and in part by Alexander of Aphrodisias,47 Averroes understood the term “material intellect” not to 
denote properly an intellect – since intellect as intellect is necessarily something in act and separate 
– but rather to denote a receptive disposition (istiʿdād) having as its subject the forms existing in 
the human imagination.48 In this way the imagination – which Averroes thought not to be a wholly 
bodily power, at least in the case of human beings – is able to serve as substrate or foundation for a 
disposition which makes possible the understanding of intelligibles in act.49 That is, the intellectual 
power existing in each understanding human being called “the material intellect” cannot literally 
be an intellect since an intellect as such is not a potency nor can it literally be material since matter 
receives an actuality only as a particular; hence, since it is a disposition actualized in human knowing, 
it remains for it to be attached to the forms of the imagination as a disposition by which human 
45  R.C. Taylor, “Intelligibles in act in Averroes”, in J.-B. Brenet (ed.), Averroès et les averroïsmes juif et latin, Actes du 
colloque tenu à Paris, 16-18 juin 2005, Brepols, Turnhout 2007 (Textes et Études du Moyen Âge, 40), pp. 111-40.
46  Ibn Rušd, Talḫīs kitāb al-nafs, ed. A.F. Al-Ahwanī, Maktabat al-Nahdat al-Mịrīya, al-Qāhira 1950, p. 74.9-10; 
Epitome de Anima, ed. S. Gómez Nogales, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientíicas, Madrid 1985, p. 108.14-15.
47  See Averroes, Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, pp. XXV-XXVIII (Introduction).
48  Averroes, Talḫīs kitāb al-nafs, p. 83.11-12 Al-Ahwanī; Epitome De Anima, p. 120.13 Gómez Nogales.
49  Averroes, Talḫīs kitāb al-nafs, p. 86.5-15 Al-Ahwanī; Epitome De Anima, p. 124.1-10 Gómez Nogales.
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understanding takes place.50 In this analysis Averroes does not provide all the details and perhaps is 
not fully coherent, but he does point clearly to the consequence that the individual human soul is 
itself perishable on this account.  For, while imagination is common to animals (and he says of human 
imagination that it “is distinguished by the fact that it does not need an organic instrument for its 
activity”, as noted earlier), it is nevertheless the case that the human imagination is a particular power 
belonging to the individual human being and is not separate immaterial intellect. To that extent, the 
power of imagination is as perishable as is the body of the human being to whom it belongs. And no 
argument for the immortality of the soul can be made through appeal to the immaterial reception 
of intelligibles in act into an essential power of the soul, since Averroes has said the material intellect 
is not literally intellect but is rather a disposition of the forms in the imagination. Precisely how this 
account allows for human intellectual understanding Averroes does not fully explain in this work, 
something not surprising since he rejects this account in his later De Anima commentaries. There 
is no hint or implication whatsoever for another way for the human attainment of theoretical or 
practical knowledge through any power of the soul that relates to prophecy.
His Middle Commentary or Talḫīṣ, completed and in circulation by 1186, contains many texts 
identical to the Long Commentary or Šarḥ based on an earlier incomplete version of the Long 
Commentary.51 Although generally a paraphrasing account of Aristotle’s De Anima in three parts 
in accord with the traditional division of the Greek, this work includes discussion which does not 
precisely correspond to the text of Aristotle, including a paragraph52 just before his paraphrase of 
De Anima 3.4 and 3.5 and a lengthy excursus53 following De Anima 3.5. It is in these additional 
materials that Averroes rejects his account in the Short Commentary and sketches a new understanding 
of the power of reason and the human soul. The most important development is a new analysis of the 
nature of the material intellect as a subject for intelligibles in act and of its relationship to the human 
soul. Disregarding the Short Commentary’s understanding of the material intellect as identiied with 
a disposition of the forms in the imagination, Averroes insists that as intellect the material intellect 
“cannot be mixed with the subject in which it is found” since if that were so
the forms of things would not exist in the intellect as they really are – that is, the forms existing in the 
intellect would be changed into forms diferent from the actual forms. If, therefore, the nature of the 
intellect is to receive the forms of things which have retained their natures, it is necessary that it be a 
faculty unmixed with any form whatsoever.54
That is, the nature of intellectually understood intelligibles in act dictates that they be received 
into a subject that is unmixed with the body or powers of a body or any other form. Consequently, 
50  See Averroes, Talḫīs kitāb al-nafs, p. 86.5-15 Al-Ahwanī; Epitome de Anima, p. 124.1-109 Gómez Nogales.
51  See Averroes, Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, pp. XXIX-XXXIII (Introduction). Also see C. Sirat - 
M. Geofroy, L’original arabe du Grand Commentaire d’ Averroès au De Anima d’ Aristote. Prémices d’édition, Vrin, 
Paris 2005 (Sic et non); and R. Glasner, “Review of Averroes. Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima. A Critical 
Edition of the Arabic Text with English Translation, Notes and Introduction, A. L. Ivry”, Aestimatio 1 (2004), pp. 57-61. 
Glasner reported her work established the date of the Long Commentary on the De Anima as ca. 1186. However, later she 
was less sanguine about the precise date while retaining the view that the irst long commentary was that on the De Anima. 
See R. Glasner, Averroes’ Physics. A Turning Point in Medieval Natural Philosophy, Oxford U.P., Oxford 2009, pp. 19-21.
52  Averroes. Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, A Critical Edition of the Arabic Text with Engl. Trans., Notes 
and Introd. by A.L. Ivry, Brigham Young U.P., Provo, Utah 2002 (Graeco-Arabic Sciences and Philosophy), p. 109 (278).
53  Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, pp. 110-12 Ivry.
54  Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, p. 109 Ivry.
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the material intellect cannot be a disposition of the forms of the imagination but must rather be 
immaterial intellect and yet also receptive.55 Here Averroes draws on his understanding of celestial 
entities, namely, the celestial bodies which the celestial souls are ‘in’ and the intellects which are 
the causes of the movement of the celestial bodies by their souls, as Marc Geofroy has rightly 
pointed out.56 In the case of the eternal heavens the moving body and its soul are not composed 
hylomorphically as are transitory sublunar beings. Rather, the soul is ‘in’ the celestial body without 
forming a single hylomorphic composite from the two, each of which is an eternal being. In the case 
of humans, the material intellect is not literally ‘in’ the body, the soul or the human composed of 
the two, since the material intellect must remain unmixed to be receptive of intelligibles without 
distortion by pre-existing formalities. Hence, an individual material intellect belongs to and exists 
‘in’ the human soul. To this extent, the power of soul called material intellect has its existence and 
individuation through its relation to and association with the individual soul existing in the body. 
Although Averroes chooses not to draw the conclusion explicitly, it is clear the perishing of the 
composite of soul and body also entails the loss of individualization and existence for the associated 
human material intellect, that is, the human being as knower. Though he again has an important 
role for the agent intellect in the abstraction and realization of forms in the human material intellect, 
unlike al-Farabi and Avicenna, there is no discussion of prophecy as something received from the 
agent intellect.
The Long Commentary on the De Anima is extant as a whole in Latin but in Arabic only in 
fragments. It is the sole commentary on the De Anima by Averroes translated into medieval Latin. 
This is a lengthy work containing the complete De Anima of Aristotle with detailed commentary 
passage by passage. While Averroes himself says that this was the irst of his long commentaries,57 it 
is unknown when he commenced work on the Long Commentary on the De Anima. Still, it has been 
established that an early version was the likely source for some identical texts found in the Middle 
Commentary and also found in an important Arabic manuscript written in Hebrew characters.58 The 
version of the text represented by the Latin translation is generally taken to be Averroes’s mature and 
inal understanding of the soul and intellect since its new doctrine of soul and intellect is referred to 
in his late Long Commentary on the Metaphysics59 and for other reasons.60
Drawing on a new reading of his own of the teachings of Themistius,61 Averroes reconceives the 
receptive material intellect as a unique and separately existing substantial principle shared by human 
beings. In this work Averroes reasons that abstraction and human intellectual understanding come 
55  Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, p. 112 Ivry.
56  M. Geofroy - C. Steel, La Béatitude de l’ âme: Éditions, traductions annotées, études doctrinales et historiques d’un 
traité d’“Averroès”, Vrin, Paris 2001 (Sic et non), pp.  64-65, 71 f. 
57  See Glasner, “Review of Averroes. Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima (above, n. 51), and Averroes’ Physics 
(above, n. 51).
58  See Sirat - Geofroy, L’original arabe (above, n. 51). Also see Averroes, Long Commentary on the De Anima of 
Aristotle, pp. XXVIII-XXXIII; L-LI (Introduction).
59  Averroes, Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, p. LII (Introduction).
60  Averroes, Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, p. L-LI (Introduction). Also see R.C. Taylor, “Textu-
al and Philosophical Issues in Averroes’ Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle”, in A.M.I. van Oppenraaij - 
R. Fontaine (eds.),The Letter before the Spirit.The Importance of Text Editions for the Study of the Reception of Aristotle, Brill, 
Leiden [etc.] 2012 (Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus, 22), pp. 267-87.
61  See R.C. Taylor, “Themistius and the development of Averroes’ Noetics”, in R.L. Friedman - J.-M. Counet (eds.), 
Medieval Perspectives on Aristotle’s De Anima, Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie - Peeters, Louvain-la-Neuve - 
Paris - Walpole (Mass.) 2013, pp. 1-38. 
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about when the two separate substances, the agent intellect and the material intellect, are intrinsically 
present in the human soul by a form of sharing or participation, albeit not substantially. As I have 
argued elsewhere, the separate material intellect in this work is a common locus for the unique set of 
intelligibles in act abstracted on the basis of sensory apprehension and shared by all human scientiic 
knowers.62 But the human soul is the irst actuality of a natural body having organs, while those 
intellects are separate from body. In light of this, Averroes determines that the term soul is equivocal 
and that intellect is not properly part of the substantial essence of the human soul. Explaining his 
understanding of Aristotle, Averroes writes,
[I]t is better to say, and seems more to be true after investigation, that this is another kind of soul and, 
if it is called a soul, it will be so equivocally. If the disposition of intellect is such as this, then it must be 
possible for that alone of all the powers of soul to be separated from the body and not to be corrupted 
by [the body’s] corruption, just as the eternal is separated. This will be the case since sometimes [the 
intellect] is not united with [the body] and sometimes it is united with it.63
That is, for a human being soul is the actuality of body responsible for the formation of the 
hylomorphic composite. The rational part of soul or intellect is not properly soul as form of the body; 
it can be called soul but only in an equivocal sense.  Intellect then does not belong properly and per 
se to this hylomorphic composite in virtue of itself but rather is only shared through the presence of 
the agent intellect and the material intellect during the earthly life of the human individual. Hence, 
no argument for personal immortality can be based on the per se presence of an intellectual – and 
thereby immaterial – power of the soul fully intrinsic to each individual human. The consequence is 
that, while the agent intellect, the material intellect, and also the human species can be reasoned to 
be eternally in existence,64 there is no basis in argument for a continued existence of the individual 
human soul after the death of the body.
These philosophical works of Averroes present a considerable challenge regarding the issue 
of prophecy. In each of the De Anima commentaries considered briely here he provides detailed 
accounts of the complex processes of human understanding. He explains in detail the important 
roles of the separate agent intellect in the Short and Middle Commentaries and of the separate agent 
intellect and material intellect in the Long Commentary yet says nothing about the psychology 
and metaphysics of prophecy. As indicated earlier, he was aware that the writings of al-Fārābī and 
Avicenna in philosophical psychology and metaphysics contained integrated accounts of prophecy 
that connected human imagination and knowing with the agent intellect. While this makes his 
De Anima commentaries anomalous in relation to the work of his predecessors in the tradition, it 
also makes his Commentary on the Parva Naturalia itself anomalous in relation to his De Anima 
commentaries. And, while in the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia he does address prophecy in 
the context of a psychology and metaphysics of dreams, he clearly sets out some severe epistemological 
aporiai for the account of prophecy and even chooses to say nothing in regard to what he had termed 
the most important issue of all regarding “the essence of happiness”.
62  Averroes, Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, p. LV f. (Introduction).
63  Averroes, Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima, pp. 160-1 Crawford; tr. Long Commentary on the De 
Anima of Aristotle, p. 128 Taylor-Druart.
64  Averroes, Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima, p. 407 Crawford; tr. Long Commentary on the De 
Anima of Aristotle, p. 322 Taylor-Druart. For a more detailed account of the Long Commentary and key issues in other 
commentaries on De Anima, see Averroes, Long Commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle, introduction, passim.
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Applying Averroes’s Own Method to His Works
Before attempting to provide a coherent account of the thought of Averroes it may be judicious 
to consider the dating of the works discussed thus far. It is generally held that the Commentary 
on the Parva Naturalia and the Short Commentary on De Anima are early works of Averroes, the 
former known to be completed in January 1170 in Seville and the latter certainly earlier, perhaps 
even a decade earlier. In the case of the latter, we know he returned to it much later making 
corrections and revisions.65 The editor of the Middle Commentary on the De Anima, Alfred Ivry, 
notes that the manuscripts give two dates for the work, 1172 and 1181.66 Because of identical 
passages of in the Middle Commentary and the Long Commentary, he argues that the former is 
posterior to the latter. I believe I have suiciently resolved this issue in favor of the traditional 
view of the Middle Commentary having been completed irst before the Long Commentary 
(completed by 1186),67 though the dating of the works of Averroes is notoriously complex. For 
the argument I am building here, it is suicient to say that these two commentaries are posterior 
to the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia and the Short Commentary on De Anima. In the three 
commentaries on De Anima Averroes kept his primary focus on his source text and the history of 
the interpretation of the nature of the soul in the philosophical tradition. It may well be that one 
should not expect an account of prophecy in these, since the issue of dreams and prophecy is not 
treated in the De Anima. Perhaps Averroes felt no need to raise it even though it was discussed by 
al-Fārābī and Avicenna. In the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia, however, the discussion of 
dreams and prophecy is suitable since they are raised in his source text, the modiied version of the 
Parva Naturalia. Nevertheless, the discussion of prophecy in the commentaries on De Anima is 
conspicuous by its complete absence.
The three dialectical religious works discussed earlier, Faṣl al-maqāl, al-Kašf, and the 
Tahāfut al-tahāfut are usually regarded as all written around 1179-1180. As explained earlier, 
in these works he follows the method set out in the Faṣl al-maqāl, dividing discourse on issues 
common to philosophy and religion into the evident suitable for all and the interpreted suitable 
only for the philosophers. As made clear earlier, that is explicitly stated in Faṣl al-maqāl and al-
Kašf. It is reiterated by negation in the Tahāfut al-tahāfut when he instructs his readers that the 
discussions in this work should be taken as merely persuasive, scil. dialectical, and that for the 
truth of the matter they should consult his demonstrative works, scil. his philosophical works.68 
These works, in which a methodology for the treatment of issues common to philosophy and 
religion is set out and employed, are all deinitely posterior to the Commentary on the Parva 
Naturalia and to the Short Commentary on De Anima and arguably prior to the Middle 
Commentary and the Long Commentary. Thus, it seems Averroes may not have yet spelled out 
in suicient detail his methodology regarding works of religion and philosophy on subjects 
common to both.69
65  See Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes (above, n. 9), pp. 265 f.
66  Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, p. 148, n. 50 Ivry.
67  Taylor, “Textual and Philosophical Issues” (above, n. 60). Also see Averroes, Long Commentary on the De Anima of 
Aristotle, pp. XXVIII f. (Introduction).
68  Averroes, Tahāfut at-tahāfut, pp. 427-8 Bouyges; tr. pp. 257-8.
69  See Averroes, Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 23 Butterworth. Hence, the assertion of the need for the suitably learned to consult 
the demonstrative works may not include the short commentaries or the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia and the 
Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction.
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The irst step in the analysis of Averroes’s account of prophecy is to follow the very methodology 
which he sets out in the Faṣl al-maqāl and references in his al-Kašf. Discourse on issues that are the 
subject of both philosophy and religion, such as the afterlife, divine providence, miracles, the nature 
of prophecy and the like, must be divided into two forms, one which is ‘evident’ (ẓāhir) and itting 
for all human beings and another which is ‘interpreted’ (muʾawwal) and itting only for the learned. 
The latter group does not consist in the ʿulamāʾ learned only in Islamic religious sciences but rather, 
as he makes clear in the Faṣl al-maqāl, the philosophers. In that work he spelled out that, when there 
is conlict in regard to truth concerning a matter of fact in both philosophy and religion, a clear 
priority must be given to philosophy with its most perfect method of qiyās, philosophical burhān, 
demonstration, where such is available. Where there is uncertainty or disagreement in interpretation 
among those skilled in philosophy, the ‘evident’ is to be retained and promulgated for the public 
and what is contentious and unresolved among the philosophically learned should not be shared 
with the public. Further, should some philosophers make mistakes regarding interpretation, they 
should not be held guilty of some failing since they are making their best efort over a complex and 
intellectually challenging matter. However, those who share their interpretations with the public 
should be condemned as themselves unbelievers since they may lead others to unbelief:
For anyone not adept in science (al-ʿilm), it is obligatory to take them [the descriptions of the next life] 
in their evident sense (ʿalā l-ẓāhiri); for him, it is unbelief to interpret them because it leads to unbelief. 
That is why we are of the opinion that, for anyone among the people whose duty it is to have faith in 
the evident sense (ʿalā l-ẓāhiri), interpretation is unbelief (at-taʾwīl fī haqqi-hi kufrun) because it leads 
to unbelief. Anyone adept in interpretation who divulges that to him calls him to unbelief; and the one 
who calls to unbelief is an unbeliever.
This is why it is obligatory that interpretations be established only in books using demonstrations 
(fī kutubi al-barāhīn). For if they are in books using demonstrations, no one but those adept in 
demonstration will get at them. Whereas, if they are established in other than demonstrative books 
with poetical and rhetorical or dialectical methods used in them, as Abū Ḥamīd al-Ġazālī does, that is 
an error against the Law and against wisdom (ʿalā al-šarʿi wa ʿalā al-ḥikma).70
Eschewing the option of providing philosophical explications – an interpreted account – of the 
nature of God, creation, providence, miracles, prophecy and the afterlife, Averroes explicitly states 
his al-Kašf to be concerned with the ‘evident’ (al-ẓāhir) aspects of these issues and proceeds to a very 
critical analysis of religious argumentation on these matters, sometimes using Aristotelian reasoning 
in the course of his critique. In this work he also provides his own form of reasoned defense of 
‘evident’ doctrines as an application of the methodology spelled out in the Faṣl al-maqāl. The same 
is true of his writing in the Faṣl al-maqāl. In the Tahāfut al-tahāfut he also generally defends the 
‘evident’ doctrines though, given the nature of the work as a philosophically reasoned response to 
the critique of the philosophers by al-Ġazālī, the argument is oftentimes substantially beyond the 
abilities of nearly anyone but a trained philosopher, even if he characterizes this work as dialectical 
since that is its primary intention. (It is perhaps in his detailed discussions of creation that Averroes 
comes closest to violating his proscription against sharing interpreted philosophical accounts with 
the public, but he was required to treat this in detail despite its complexity since the issue is treated 
at length with considerable depth by al-Ġazālī in the Tahāfut al-falāsifa).
70  Averroes, Faṣl al-Maqāl, p. 2 Butterworth. Arabic added. Tr. slightly modiied.
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In his philosophical or demonstrative commentaries on De Anima and his Long Commentary on 
the Metaphysics Averroes denies the afterlife as literally understood to human beings or the human 
soul. In the latter work he also argues in detail against the notion of creation ex nihilo reasoning 
for a conception of creation as without beginning and also against the notion of particular divine 
providence. Regarding the nature of God, he reasons in his Long Commentary on the Metaphysics 
that God has only knowledge of Himself, a conception of knowledge based on the Aristotelian 
notion that knowledge is the understanding of causes.71 As such, knowledge of particulars qua 
particulars is unavailable to God as immaterial intellectual knower of universals (quite in accord with 
the reasoning of the early Commentary on the Parva Naturalia). This has important implications for 
his conception of prophecy.
Now since he has made it clear in his discussion of method on issues common to religion 
and philosophy that it is impossible for truth to contradict truth, that is, he denies that there 
is one truth for religion and another for philosophy,72 it is then in philosophy or science that 
the truth is fully found. The Commentary on the Parva Naturalia does not provide any 
discussion of the distinction of discourse reasoned in detail by Averroes in the Faṣl al-maqāl. 
Rather, its account of prophecy is philosophically discussed in the manner of what he later 
calls an ‘interpreted’ discourse, one denoting the truth in the fullest sense, even if he does not 
complete the discussion of the second issue there, namely, how an immaterial intellect can 
know particulars. Hence, it is clear that nothing prevents us from asserting that the teachings 
(and their implications) found in the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia are in accord with his 
own thought on the nature of prophecy. It may well be that the cautious distinction of ‘evident’ 
discourse from ‘interpreted’ discourse spelled out in detail in the Faṣl al-maqāl and exercised in 
al-Kašf and Tahāfut al-tahāfut determined for Averroes a methodology he would make efort to 
employ from the time of the writing of the Faṣl al-maqāl. Regardless of that, Averroes’s world 
view is non-traditional and, as Davidson puts it, involves “an extremely radical statement for 
a medieval philosopher”.
The deep concerns indicated by Davidson with respect to the Commentary on the Parva 
Naturalia remain and can be raised even more broadly. For Averroes there is no cogent 
philosophical account of prophecy that is congruous with the traditional religious conception of 
prophecy as literally a conveyance and instruction provided to human beings on the nature of God, 
on the things of world, or on the proper nature of human conduct and fulillment. Davidson’s 
remarks that “The discrepancy is harsh” between the Commentary on the Parva Naturalia and 
what we ind in “Averroes’ Tahāfut al-Tahāfut and semipopular works” can be considered as a 
consequential symptom of the doctrine of the two sorts discourse, one in the non-philosophical 
works as predominantly ‘evident’ (ẓāhir) containing a teaching meant to be taken literally, the 
other philosophical in aiming at the truth in the fullest sense and labeled ‘interpreted’ (muʾawwal). 
Davidson’s further assertion follows if we ourselves play the role of philosopher and apply 
Averroes’s own method to his works: “The term prophet would, on this reading, mean nothing 
more than the human author of Scripture; and the term revelation would mean a high level of 
philosophical knowledge”.73
71  See Averroes, Tafsir ma baʿd at-tabiʿat, pp. 1708-9 Bouyges.
72  See R.C. Taylor, “ ‘Truth does not contradict truth’: Averroes and the Unity of Truth”, Topoi 19 (2000), pp. 3-16.
73 Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes (above, n. 9), pp. 351-2.
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Some concluding remarks
Averroes’s teachings on prophecy as well as those on the afterlife, creation, God’s nature and 
action, miracles and other related issues follow from his eforts to craft his own Neo-Aristotelian 
rationalist Weltanschauung or worldview while living in a cultural context of Abrahamic traditions 
which set out a conception of God distinctively diferent from that of the pagan Greek Aristotelian 
philosophical tradition. While the deity of this religious tradition is conceived as generous and 
benevolent, intimately present to the world, and acting freely in every way, the Neo-Aristotelian 
approach philosophically conceived and followed by Averroes entailed principles antithetical to 
that religious tradition. These are hardly di cult to see regarding his conception of the divinity. 
God is thought thinking thought intending only Himself, not something lower. Further, since 
there are only four causes for his philosophical master Aristotle, inal, formal, moving and material, 
God is not a ifth kind of eiciently creating cause nor is God intimately and immediately acting 
in the lives of things below by his own eicient causality. Averroes does not provide us with any 
other explanation of the conciliation of the religious and the philosophical or scientiic except 
what we ind in the Faṣl al-maqāl’s reasoning and entailments. He provides no discussion of any 
approach similar to that of Kantian antinomies or a method to transcend the philosophically ‘harsh’ 
consequences which follow on his methodology. Nevertheless, he was man of Islamic religious 
practice and a deeply intelligent and committed jurist who played key roles in the application of 
religious rules of human practice in the courts of Cordoba and Seville.
One might be inclined to conclude that Averroes remains an enigmatic igure with an 
idiosyncratic conception of his professed Abrahamic religion. Yet he clearly enough explains 
his philosophical worldview methodically and generally follows that method in his writings, 
setting out teachings that accord with the principles of religion in his ‘evident’ (ẓāhir) works 
while reserving explanations that clash with religion for investigation by philosophers suited for 
‘interpreted’ (muʾawwal) writings. In this he develops perhaps more explicitly and more radically 
the worldview found in the writings of al-Fārābī who airmed an afterlife but also in his Book of 
Religion (Kitāb al-milla) explained that virtuous religion has a practical part that sets out universals 
and rules for right human action though these are properly speaking “subordinate to the universals 
of practical philosophy” and a theoretical part that consists of religious opinions which “have their 
demonstrative proofs in theoretical philosophy and are taken in religion without demonstrative 
proofs”.74 Averroes’s al-Kašf represents his attempt to craft a form of ‘evident’ (ẓāhir) religious 
kalām largely on the basis of a Neo-Aristotelian based critique of reasoning by predecessors on 
religious opinions or beliefs. Yet in his ‘interpreted’ (muʾawwal) works of philosophy, he sets out 
teachings that are directly – or by clear argumentative implication – quite contrary to those of 
the religion in which he was raised, as mentioned just above in the previous paragraph. What is 
more, as I have shown elsewhere,75 in his theoretical Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle 
he states explicitly that the most perfect form of worship of the Divinity is to be found in knowing 
God and creatures in the science of metaphysics as a religious obligation speciic to philosophers 
(al-šarīʿa al-ḫāṣṣa bi-l-ḥukamāʾ).76 Hence, it seems reasonable to conclude that Averroes found 
74  Alfarabi. The Political Writings. Selected Aphorisms and Other Texts, tr. Ch.E. Butterworth, Cornell U.P., Ithaca - 
London 2001, p. 97.
75  Taylor, “Averroes on the Sharīʿah of the Philosophers” (above, n. 6).
76  Cf. S. Harvey, “Avicenna and Maimonides on Prayer and Intellectual Worship,” in H. Ben-Shammai (ed.), 
Exchange and Transmission across Cultural Boundaries: Philosophy, Mysticism and Science in the Mediterranean World, 
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in philosophy and its sciences the most complete and precise truth content and highest levels of 
knowledge and understanding and from them constructed his worldview. Given that perspective, 
religion — which is indispensable for proper human ethical and political development77 – is like 
an Aristotelian practical science in that it concerns good and right conduct in the achievement of 
an end attained in action, not truths to be known for their own sake.78
Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Jerusalem 2013, pp. 82-105,
77  See Averroes, Tahāfut at-tahāfut, pp. 582-3 Bouyges; tr. pp. 359-61.
78  My thanks to Peter Adamson, Matteo Di Giovanni and Jules Janssens for valuable comments and suggestions on a 
draft of this article. I am also very grateful to Steven Harvey for his close reading of the penultimate draft and for sharing 
many critical comments and suggestions.
